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LIFE INSURANCE: INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP
AND ECONOMIC BENEFIT
RICHARD C. GROLL*
IIILE CONGRESS has been faced over the years with the task of
taxing intricately complicated business schemes, corporate
organizations and sophisticated tax avoidance devices and
done reasonably well, it faces the continual problem of appropriately
taxing life insurance proceeds. The problem of the appropriate estate
taxation of life insurance proceeds commands, with reasonable justifi-
cation, a position of deep concern. While most taxpayers can look
with curious delight at the machinations of highly paid tax counsel in
working out tax avoidance or tax reduction schemes for those in the
highest wealth brackets, life insurance is an asset owned by the bulk of
American citizens.1 On this basis, life insurance occupies a position of
diverse concern, and because of the dollar magnitude of its acceptance,
the Treasury carefully scrutinizes the taxation of the proceeds.
Generally, one purchases a policy of insurance on his own life for
the purpose of providing a fund of money to pass at his death to the
objects of his bounty. The primary goal to be accomplished by the
purchase and maintenance of such a contract is the creation of this
fund and its passing at death. Since 1954 and the repeal of the premium
payment test,2 life insurance has become increasingly more popular as
an estate planning tool because the insured can provide for the objects
of his bounty and with comparative ease prevent estate tax liability.
CURRENT ESTATE TAX PROVISION
The current provision for the estate taxation of life insurance pro-
ceeds categorizes such proceeds as (a) those payable to the estate of
the insured, and (b) those payable to named beneficiaries other than
* MR. GROLL is an Assistant Professor of Law at the De Paul University College of
Law. He received an A.B. from Northwestern University, a J.D. cum laude from the
Loyola University School of Law, and he has an LL.M. from the Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law.
1 KLsiy & DANIELS, LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1964); in 1962, 65% of the American
population owned more than $675.9 billion in life insurance protection.
2 GROLL, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 48 (1965).
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the estate. Insurance proceeds paid to the estate of the insured are
fully taxable, but with regard to the proceeds payable to beneficiaries
other than the insured's estate, the sole test for estate tax includability
is whether the insured possessed at his death any incidents of owner-
ship under the policy. If the insured possessed any of the incidents
exercisable alone or in conjunction with any other person, the pro-
ceeds are includible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes.
The Regulations provide that the phrase "incidents of ownership"
is not limited in application to ownership of the insurance contract in
the technical property law sense; it has reference to the right of the
insured to the economic benefit of the contract. According to the
Regulations, the phrase includes "the power to change the beneficiary,
to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan or to obtain from the in-
surer a loan against the surrender value of the [policy.]" 4
While the incidents of ownership test, as set forth in section 2042,
may appear to be straightforward, it is deceptively complex when
applied to the insurance arrangements currently in vogue. In this
regard, concern has been expressed as to the true scope of the section,'
and it appears that this concern properly centers on the question of
whether the phrase "incidents of ownership" is genuinely synonymous
with the notion of economic ownership. The Regulations appear to
indicate that the current estate tax treatment of life insurance proceeds
was designed to make such proceeds subject to liability when the in-
surance policy was in fact, if not in law, an asset of the insured at the
time of his death.' This position is substantiated by the 1954 Senate
Report, which preceeded the repeal of the premium payment test and
the enactment of the current provision; the Report stated the matter as
follows:
3 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2042: "The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property-
(1) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable by the ex-
ecutor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount receivable by
all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with re-
spect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."
4 Treasury Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
5 See Seeley & Locke, Estate Planning with Employee Group Term Life Insurance,
52 A.B.A.J. 485 (1966).
6 Supra note 4.
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The proceeds of life insurance on a decedent are subject to tax in his estate
under present law if the policy is payable to the executor, if the decedent paid
the premiums on the policy (in this case includible in proportion to the amount
paid), or if the decedent possessed any element of ownership in the policy at
date of death. No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent
initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to
the property and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not
justified.7
POWER CONCEPT
While there may be support for classifying the test for estate tax
liability of life insurance proceeds as involving a determination of eco-
nomic ownership, question has been generated as to whether the magi-
cal phrase "incidents of ownership" sets down a broader standard. The
question presented: Will insurance proceeds be included within the
scope of section 2042 when the insured had a power to effect the dis-
tribution of the policy proceeds, but did not have economic benefits?
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Company8 discussed at some length the scope of the
phrase "incidents of ownership." While the decision can hardly be de-
scribed as a landmark, it is worthy of inquiry since the Treasury
apparently conceded that the decedent insured possessed no economic
benefit in the policy,' and yet the court found the proceeds subject to
estate tax liability under section 2042.
Charles A. Horton and his wife, Louise, had two sons-Holton W.
Horton and A. Trowbridge Horton. In 1924, when Holton was 18
years old and Trowbridge was 19 years old, their father purchased a
policy of life insurance in the face amount of $50,000 on the life of
each son. The death proceeds of each policy were payable to Charles
and Louise, equally, or to the survivor of them. The avowed purpose
of Charles' purchase of the insurance "was to assure that funds would
be available for his wife, should he and either son die."1 °
Focusing on that policy issued on the life of Holton, Charles kept it
in his safety deposit box and paid all premiums throughout his life. In
January, 1952, Louise Horton died. Some two months after the death
of Louise, Charles instructed Holton to go to the office of the insur-
ance company and execute a change of beneficiary form. The amend-
ment, executed by Holton, named Charles as primary beneficiary,
Holton's wife and brother as successive beneficiaries, and the estate of
7 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2 Sess. 472 (1954). 9 Id. at 9.
8 355 F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1966). 1OId. at8.
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the survivor as final beneficiary. Holton Horton died April 1, 1958,
survived by his wife and father; Charles Horton died October 2, 1961.
In dealing with this fact situation, the District Court discussed the
facts at length and pronounced that Horton, the decedent insured, did
not possess any of the incidents of ownership in the policy and for
estate tax purposes the proceeds were not includible in his gross
estate.'1 At trial, Trowbridge Horton testified that while he and his
late brother were students at preparatory school, his father purchased
the policies, and "we did not recognize that we became the owners of
those policies."'1 2 The court summarized the facts relevant to conclud-
ing that the insured, Holton, did not possess the requisite incidents of
ownership by saying:
[H]e had his two sons execute applications for policies that were subsequently
issued on their respective lives; that he paid the initial and all subsequent
premiums thereon, retained the policies and that the sons saw said policies on
only one occasion, prior to the death of Holton W. Horton; that there was
no discussion between him and his sons about said policies until 1952 when
his wife died.... 13
The District Court concluded that the proceeds of the insurance
policy on Holton's life were not includible in his gross estate, even
though the policy provided, among other things, that: the right to
change the beneficiary was reserved to Holton, the insured; the in-
sured, Holton, had the option of disposing of policy dividends during
his lifetime; the insurer could make a loan on the policy on the signa-
ture of Holton alone; if no beneficiary survived the insured, the pro-
ceeds were payable to his estate; and that by virtue of the policy the
insured was a member of the company and was entitled to certain
voting privileges.
Upon rendition of the decision of the District Court, the govern-
ment appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 4 While the rever-
sal was clearly in order, it is curious that the court failed to find that
Holton was the economic owner of the policy. In reversing, the court
indicated that Congress had not limited the scope of section 2042 to
questions of technical ownership, but was attempting to include within
the breadth of the section the "power" possessed by an insured, to
effect the disposition of the policy proceeds; the court said:
First, it is clear that the reference to ownership in the "technical legal sense"
is not abandoned and supplanted by reference to "economic benefits." Second,
11241 F.Supp. 586 (D.C. R.I. 1965). '3 Id. at 589.
12 Id. at 588. 14 Supra note 8.
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the regulation goes on to list illustrative powers referred to by Congress in
its reports. All of these powers which may or may not enrich decedent's
estate, but which can affect the transfer of the policy proceeds. 15
This language of the Court of Appeals sets forth the basic notion that
if ownership of the insurance contract, in the technical property
sense, is established, then nothing else need be shown for the proceeds
to be includible for estate tax purposes. There can be little controversy
with the court's position; if the insured has technical ownership, even
if he does not choose to utilize the asset for his own benefit or to bene-
fit his estate, he still has the right of utilization, and therefore, at death
the product of that asset (i.e., the death proceeds) should be numbered
in his gross estate for estate tax purposes.
This basic notion could have been applied to resolve the instant case.
Since Holton, the insured, was the policy owner and possessed almost
every conceivable contract right, the policy of life insurance should
be considered one of his assets, and the proceeds of the policy of life
insurance should be subject to estate tax liability. 16 This result should
follow simply from the application of this basic ownership notion,
even though Holton might have felt morally obligated not to utilize
the asset for his own benefit during his lifetime or to benefit his estate
or creditors at death. 17 The court, however, went beyond the applica-
tion of the ownership test in resolving the controversy; the court dis-
cussed at least indirectly the situation where the decedent insured pos-
sesses one or more contract rights, but does not have technical owner-
ship of the insurance policy.18 The court expressed the concept that
the proceds of a life insurance contract will be estate tax includible
where the decedent insured, though not the owner, possessed a power
"which can affect the transfer of the policy proceeds."' 9
DIVESTMENT OF BENEFIT BUT NOT POWER
While the scope of section 2042 is not limited to the technical
property ownership of insurance contracts, the general tenor of the
Regulations" and the Congressional reports,2 ' which preceded enact-
ment of the incidents of ownership test, indicate an intention that
economic benefit be the taxing criterion. The court, in Rhode Island,
15 Id. at 11. 16 Id. at 9. 17 Id. at 8.
18 Supra note 4 and corresponding text.
19 Supra note 15. 20 Supra note 4 and corresponding text.
21 Supra note 7. Also, H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942) and S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942).
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has touched upon the concept that the scope of section 2042 does in-
clude the taxation of a power and is not limited to the economic bene-
fit standard.
Consider the following fact situation: A purchases a policy of insur-
ance on the life of B; A reserves all contract rights under the policy
and names himself beneficiary of the death proceeds. Suppose, how-
ever, that A subsequently grants to B the right to change the benefi-
ciary. Of all the contract rights, there is probably more authority for
classifying the right to change the beneficiary as an incident of owner-
ship under section 2042 than any other right.2 Therefore, upon B's
death, the proceeds would be included in his gross estate for estate tax
purposes. In this connection, it should be remembered that an incident
of ownership need only be possessed in order to include the death pro-
ceeds of a policy of life insurance; the word retained is not used in the
section.
Suppose the situation is complicated by the addition of one small
fact: even though B, the insured, has the right to change the bene-
ficiary, he does not have the right to name either himself, his creditors,
or his estate as beneficiary. By the addition of this fact, we are faced
with a genuine test of whether section 2042 does indeed tax a power
over proceed distribution in the absence of economic benefit. By the
reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals in Rhode Island, the death
proceeds should be subject to estate tax liability, since the insured pos-
sesses the right to effect the transfer of the death proceeds. 4 The
question may be asked: Where is the economic benefit? If economic
benefit is the criterion, then the proceeds should escape estate tax lia-
bility.
INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP
The above hypothetical might be compared to the situation where
the power to change a beneficiary is the sole incident of ownership
possessed by an insured, and such power is lost. In the latter case, the
proceeds should become free of estate tax liability under section 2042.
An insured may rid himself of this incident of ownership by making
an irrevocable designation of the beneficiary.2" Such irrevocable desig-
nation has been held sufficient even where the irrevocably designated
22 For a collection of cases see: LOUNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & Girt TAXES
(2d ed. 1962) at 280 n. 34.
23 Supra note 3. 24 Supra note 15 and corresponding text.
25 Estate of Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956).
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beneficiary owner gave the insured a right to designate a relative to
receive one-half the proceeds. In Estate of John C. Morrow, 26 the de-
cedent's employer purchased an insurance policy on his life in the face
amount of $10,000. The insurance policy provided that the death pro-
ceeds should be paid to the employer "for its sole benefit with the right
to exercise any options herein, and to receive all payments of whatso-
ever nature that may become due without the consent of the in-
sured. 27 The decedent insured had no right to change the beneficiary,
and the employer paid all policy premiums.
Before death, the decedent was notified by his employer that it was
its purpose "in the event of your [decedent's] death to pay one-half of
the proceeds of the insurance to your family. '28 The decedent was
requested to designate a family member to receive the $5,000 payment,
and the decedent designated his wife. The decedent's wife prede-
ceased him, and upon her death, he wrote to his employer requesting
that his daughter replace his deceased wife as recipient of the payment;
the request was granted.
The Commissioner contended that the $5,000 death payment should
be included in the decedent's gross estate as proceeds of a life insur-
ance contract over which the decedent possessed incidents of owner-
ship within the scope of section 8 11 (g)." Even though the decedent
apparently could control the designation of the recipient, the court
concluded that he possessed no incidents of ownership in the involved
policy. In reaching this result, the court took note of the fact that the
decedent was not the owner of his corporate employer,"0 and it is
asserted that the inarticulated controlling factor was the absence of
economic benefit in the decedent.
The question presented is whether the cases interpreting the magi-
cal phrase "incidents of ownership" have expanded the taxing scope to
include more than economic benefit. One often cited case is Commis-
sioner v. Treganowan;-" in this case, question arose as to a $20,000 pay-
ment made to certain members of the decedent's family by reason of
his death. The decedent had been a member of the New York Stock
Exchange, and its constitution provided for a "Gratuity Fund" from
26 19 T.C. 1068 (1953). 27 Id. at 1069. 28 Ibid.
29 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 811(g), which provided for inclusion of life
insurance proceeds where the decedent possessed incidents of ownership in the policies
as similarly provided by section 2042 of the current Code, supra note 3.
30 Supra note 2 6, at 1068, 107 1. 31 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950).
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which a death benefit would be made payable by virtue of the contri-
butions of surviving members. The decedent had no right to designate,
in any way, the recipient of this death benefit; the constitution of the
Exchange prescribed the family members to receive the death pay-
ment.
While the executrix of the decedent's estate excluded the $20,000
payment from the gross estate, the Commissioner sought inclusion on
the grounds that (a) the death payment constituted the proceeds of
life insurance, and (b) the decedent possessed certain powers with
respect to the "Gratuity Fund" which constituted incidents of owner-
ship within the application of section 811(g) of the 1939 Code. 2 In
dealing with this situation, the Tax Court33 held that the death pay-
ment was not life insurance, since no insurance risk was presented;3 1
upon review, however, the Court of Appeals held that the plan con-
tained the essential elements of life insurance, since the risk of death
was shifted to, or diffused among, a group of people. Once concluding
that the benefit constituted life insurance, the court went on to deter-
mine that the decedent did possess the requisite incidents of ownership,
and found the payment to be subject to estate tax liability.
In finding that the decedent did possess the requisite incidents of
ownership so as to include the policy proceeds within his taxable gross
estate, the court seized upon the fact that the decedent could sell his
Exchange seat, and thereby cancel the policy and the beneficial in-
terests created in favor of his family members.35 On this basis, this case
might be cited in support of the proposition that the incidents of own-
ership test does include the taxation of the power to effect distribution
of the policy proceeds; however, the court put the matter as follows:
An Exchange member does have the power to sell his seat, thus divesting his
beneficiary of any right to payments, and entitling the purchaser to the same
insurance which the seller has had. This power to cancel one's own engage-
ment and substitute another seems to us an incident of ownership, within the
statutory meaning. The purchase price of a seat on the Exchange is necessarily
the sum of the value of the bundle of rights which such a seat comprises.
One of these rights is that of having the sum of $20,000 paid to his family upon
a member's death. Thus the seller receives a cash consideration, however diffi-
cult to evaluate, for terminating this insurance. It seems impossible to dis-
tinguish this consideration from the surrender value paid upon cancellation
of an old line.., policy.36
32 Supra note 29.
33 Estate of Strauss, 13 T.C. 159 (1949). 35 Supra note 4 and corresponding text.
34 Groll, supra note 2, at 79. 36 183 F.2d at 292-93.
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Thus, it would appear that the court found that the decedent insured
possessed incidents of ownership based on his right to secure an eco-
nomic benefit from the "Gratuity Fund." Tax liability for the $20,000
death payment followed since, in the court's view, the decedent pos-
sessed the power to sell the right to secure the death payment and such
sale monetarily would benefit the decedent. The result did not follow
from the mere fact of possession of a power to terminate or cancel the
right to receive the payment. It seems justified to conclude that in each
case, the courts have been looking to see whether the insured had the
economic benefit of the involved policy of life insurance, though he
does not have technical legal ownership. The approach has not been
the taxation of a power, in the absence of economic benefit.
While the courts have found inclusion of policy proceeds where the
insured held indirect control over the contract of insurance, they have
denied inclusion where the insured possessed the right to give invest-
ment advice to a trustee of an insurance trust. In Estate of Mudge,"7
the decedent created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his wife for
life, and upon her death each of two sons was to receive one-half the
trust income for his life with the corpus passing to such persons as the
son might by will appoint. With respect to the management of the
property, the trust instrument vested the trustee with certain discre-
tionary powers but provided that "during the lifetime of [the Donor],
shall follow any instructions he [the Donor] may give." '38
In weighing the estate tax liability of the insurance proceeds in light
of the incidents of ownership test, the court discussed the power re-
served to the decedent and stated: "This seems to us so clearly limited
to investment advice and not to include any 'economic benefits' that
we cannot construe it as, to any extent, an incident of ownership
retained by decedent. a3 The court, thereby, concluded that since the
decedent could not economically benefit from the retention of the
right, he did not possess any incidents of ownership, even though his
actions certainly could effect the beneficial interests. Similarly, in
Estate of Carlton, ° the court held that a veto power held by a decedent
insured over changes of investments by a trustee of an insurance trust
did not constitute an incident of ownership.
In exploring the economic benefit notion and the right to change the
beneficiary: in cases prior to 1942, in which the insured could change
37 27 T.C. 188 (1956). 39 Id. at 193.
3 8 1d. at 191. 40 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
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the beneficiary only by securing the consent of the presently desig-
nated beneficiary, the requirement of securing consent was considered
to have deprived the insured of this incident of ownership.41 In 1942,
the Internal Revenue Code was modified, and it now provides that the
proceeds of life insurance on the life of a decedent will be included in
an estate tax computation if the decedent possessed incidents of owner-
ship "either alone or in conjunction with any other person. '42 In inter-
preting this added phrase, it has been held that a decedent possessed
incidents of ownership in policies transferred to a trust which could be
altered, amended, or revoked only upon the consent of the decedent
insured, his wife, and daughter.43 This change has caused an expansion
of the estate taxation of life insurance proceeds, and estate tax liability
should follow where an insured can change the beneficiary only upon
securing the approval of the present beneficiary or where an insured's
approval is necessary before a change of beneficiary can take place.
In Goldstein's Estate,44 the named beneficiary was given every con-
ceivable contract right under the policy of life insurance, including the
right to change the beneficiary; however, no change of beneficiary
was allowed unless the consent of the insured was granted. In weigh-
ing the taxability of the insurance proceeds in the estate of the insured
in light of the added language of the taxing provision, the court held
the proceeds liable to taxation, and stated:
To say that his control was "negative" or in the nature of a veto power
does not diminish its effectiveness as an incident of ownership. It was, during
his life, exactly equivalent to the control of the named beneficiary. Neither
could act without the concurrence of the other.45
While it may be more difficult to state that the insured, in Goldstein,
possessed economic benefits in the policy, it can reasonably be argued
that by or through his action the insured can secure benefits from the
contract (i.e., he has not placed the policy beyond his control as to
securing benefits for himself). If, however, one concludes that the
added phrase "in conjunction with another" can bring about tax liabil-
ity in instances where economic benefit is absent, this conclusion
41 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities, Ex'rs v. Comm'r.,
79 F.2d 295 (3rd Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935).
42 Supra note 7.
4" Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cit. 1956).
44 129 Ct. C1. 264, 122 F.Supp. 677 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
45 122 F.Supp. at 678.
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should not interfere with the premise of this article that incidents of
ownership should be defined as equivalent to economic benefit.
In a further attempt to define the scope of the taxing phrase "inci-
dents of ownership," the Regulations specifically indicate that the
Treasury contemplates inclusion of the proceeds of a policy where the
policy is owned by a corporation of which the insured is the sole
stockholder; 4 however, in Estate of Knipp,47 it was held that owner-
ship of a fifty percent share of a partnership by an insured does not
constitute an incident of ownership over policies owned by the part-
nership entity. The court stated that the insured partner had no rights
in the policy, except "those flowing from his partnership interest,''48
and such rights were insufficient for estate tax inclusion under the inci-
dents of ownership test. It is apparent that the insured in Knipp could
exercise some degree of control affecting the distribution of policy
proceeds; however, such control would be to benefit the partnership
entity, the policy owner, and therefore, the court concluded that the
proceeds escaped estate tax liability.
Clearly, Congress could have couched the language of section 2042
so as to tax the power as it has under sections of the Internal Revenue
Code dealing with powers of appointment.49 While the estate tax pro-
visions relating to powers of appointment have gone from the mild to
the severe to the moderate, a look at the taxing provisions under the
1942 Act is in order.5" Under this provision, the exercise and non-
exercise of a power of appointment was subject to estate taxation, and
such powers were generally taxed even though the power be a special
power.51
With certain exceptions, the 1942 Act put the property subject to a
power of appointment, whether a general power or a special power,
under the shadow of estate tax liability for inclusion in the donee's
gross estate. While this rather extreme taxing provision has been
4 6 Treasury Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
47 25 T.C. 153, aff'd. on other grounds, 244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 827 (1957).
48 25 T.C. at 168.
49 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954, 5 2041.
50 403, Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 942 (1942).
51 403, Revenue Act of 1942, excluded from tax liability such powers of appointment
where the donee could only appoint to members of his immediate family or that of
the donor or to a charity and powers which could be exercised by a fiduciary in favor
of a restricted class of individuals. For a discussion see: LOUNDES & KRAMER, supra note
22, at 260.
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altered, and by the terms of the current Code provision only general
powers of appointment are subject to estate tax liability in the estate of
the donee,52 the court in the Rhode Island case would, at least implied-
ly, draw analogy to section 2042. Referring to the enactment of the
incidents of ownership test, that court said:
[Ilt was not trying to tax the extent of the interest of the decedent. That it
knew how to do this is evident, for example, from a reading of section 2033
w.. Which includes in the gross estate of the decedent "the value of all prop-
erty ... to the extent therein. . . ." What it was attempting to reach in section
2042 and some other sections was the power to dispose of property. .... 53
CONCLUSION
It would be easiest to merely proffer the suggestion that the reason-
ing of the Court of Appeals in the Rhode Island case is error, and that
the enactment of section 2042 demonstrates an intention that economic
benefit should be the guiding principle in the estate tax liability of life
insurance proceeds. While Congress did not limit the scope of section
2042 to mere ownership principles as under section 2033,54 it did not
grant the same breadth as was granted under section 403 of the 1942
Act, which taxed powers of appointment to the estate of the donee
irrespective of economic benefit.
The Court of Appeals in Rhode Island was attempting to strike at
the basic difference between the taxation of ownership interests under
the application of section 2033 and the distinct provisions for the taxa-
tion of life insurance proceeds under section 2042. Contracts of life
insurance are basically different from other assets, and therefore, war-
rant a special Code provision. While the Senate Report, which pre-
ceded the enactment of section 2042, sought to place the taxation of
life insurance proceeds on the same basis as other assets, 5 the position
was shattered by the minority report, which stated in part:
It is sought to justify this change as merely putting life insurance on a par
with other property which may be given away free from estate tax if the
gift is not made "in contemplation of death." But life insurance is not like
other property, it is inherently testamentary in nature. It is designed, in effect,
to serve as a will regardless of its investment features. 56
52 Supra note 50 and see: LOUNDES & KRAMER, supra note 22, at 261.
53 Supra note 8, at 10.
54 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2033: "The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the
time of his death."
55 Supra note 7. 56 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., A316 (1954).
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Since life insurance is deemed to be a distinctive type asset, it might
be argued that section 2042 is not limited to legal ownership and eco-
nomic benefit principles, but must be broader in application. However,
the very thrust of the Regulations and the Congressional Reports indi-
cates that an attempt was made to place the taxation of life insurance
proceeds on a par with the taxation of other assets; the special provision
was tailored to take cognizance of the difference in the nature of the
life insurance contract only to the extent of including proceeds where
the insured, though not the legal owner of the policy, did possess the
economic benefit of ownership. Where economic benefit is missing,
the proceeds should go untaxed.
If the phrase "incidents of ownership" is not defined to be synony-
mous with notions of economic benefit, but includes the power, pos-
sessed by an insured to effect distribution schemes of the policy pro-
ceeds, one can concoct realistic problems involving the definition and
limit of this power concept. In this regard, serious question has arisen
as to the scope of section 2042 and its application to group term insur-
ance arrangements,5" which might be touched upon here. The Treas-
ury Regulations indicate that one incident of ownership is the right of
the insured "to surrender or cancel the policy.""s Consider the follow-
ing situation where an insured does have the power to effect distribu-
tion schemes through an ability to cause cancellation of the policy, but
does not have economic benefit in the contract of insurance.
First, A purchases a group term life insurance policy on his own life
through his employer, naming B as beneficiary; such policy is subject
to cancellation upon termination of employment. Assume further that
A validly assigns the policy to B, and thereafter B possesses every con-
ceivable contract right. A can work a cancellation of the policy by
voluntarily terminating his employment. Does A, therefore, possess in-
cidents of ownership sufficient to warrant inclusion of proceeds in his
gross estate?
Second, A purchases a policy of life insurance on B's life and A
names himself beneficiary. Assume further that A possesses every con-
ceivable contract right, but B makes the premium payments. Suppose,
subsequently, B stops paying the premiums; B's action in discontinuing
the premium payments causes the cancellation of the policy. Does B
hold the requisite incidents of ownership in the policy, because of his
power to cause a cancellation?
58 Supra note 4 and corresponding text.57 Supra note 5.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
There has been suggestion that life insurance proceeds should be
subject to broader estate tax liability than mere legal and economic
ownership, since life insurance is inherently testamentary.59 The pur-
chase of life insurance on one's own life is generally made for the
avowed purpose of providing for a fund of money to pass at death to
the objects of one's bounty. Life insurance was devised and per-
petuated in popularity as an effective mechanism for creating and
maintaining this fund of money. The basic concept of life insurance is
the accomplishment of this goal, and all other attributes are secondary
in importance. Once concluding that life insurance is inherently testa-
mentary, it is urged that it should receive the tax treatment consistent
with this basic characteristic; the premium payment test or a variation
thereof is most appropriate."
While it can be argued cogently that the premium payment test is
the most appropriate method of taxing life insurance proceeds, especial-
ly when coupled with the incidents of ownership test for estate tax
inclusion, the current provisions of section 2042 should not be dis-
torted in order to broaden the scope of the section beyond principles
of taxing legal and economic ownership. To capture within the taxable
gross estate life insurance schemes which fall outside of the breadth of
economic ownership, the premium payment test can be re-enacted;
however, such re-enactment should be the product of Congressional
action, and not by virtue of court interpretation.
59 Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance: A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain Cost
of Dying, 55 HARV. L. REv. 266, 230-35 (1941).
60 Groll, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 48, 57 -61
(1965).
